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In this symposium, the editors of the Tulsa Law Review have undertaken the
important challenge of illuminating the contours of disputed concepts in contemporary
business association law. Through the analysis of leading scholars in the field, the
following articles clarify the nature of those disputes. The first is the concept of
fiduciary duty. Under the title of "A Question of Duty," this concept was explored at the
2006 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools Section on Agency,
Partnership, Limited Liability Companies, and Unincorporated Associations.l
The authors of the articles in this symposium that speak about the topic of fiduciary duty
presented earlier versions of their work at that meeting. The second concept discussed is
the "capital lock-in" or "asset partitioning" characteristic of corporations.
New scholarship in the field of corporate law and in the larger context of business
association law has isolated for investigation this unique characteristic of corporations
that serves as an additional analytical tool for understanding the nature and enduring
utility of the corporate entity. We are most fortunate to have leading scholars in the field
shed light on the concept in this symposium of the Tulsa Law Review.
The topics of fiduciary duty and capital lock-in have engaged business association
law scholars in ongoing debate, and the editors of this symposium have selected scholars
whose work is representative of the excellence and rigor those critical issues demand.
With regard to each topic, the dialectics of argument in the articles go a long way toward
identifying the pivotal issues involved, clarifying the analysis required, and illuminating
the underlying public policies at stake. A brief overview of each article follows.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Debates over the proper place of fiduciary duties in business association law are
longstanding. To what extent, if any, must business people curtail the pursuit of their
own self-interest by complying with a duty owed to the business entity itself or to other
participants within the business? The current version of the debate appears to create
dialectic between those who favor deference to a freedom of contract model-usually
* Barbara K. Bucholtz is a professor at the University of Tulsa College of Law.
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dubbed "contractarians"-and those who espouse the imposition of a fiduciary
restraint-sometimes called "fiduciarians."
In his article, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated Business Entities: In Defense
of the "Manifestly Unreasonable" Standard, Professor Mark Loewenstein observes that
contractarians have seemed to prevail. 2 As evidence, he points to a clear trend away
from statutorily imposed fiduciary duties in unincorporated business association law.
While the first Uniform Act of 1914 ("UPA") failed to delineate any fiduciary duties
expressly, it was evident that under UPA, mandatory fiduciary duties were implied by
UPA's presumptive reliance upon common law agency principles and the fiduciary
duties inherent in the common law of agency. By contrast, the three modem Uniform
Acts that followed: the revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1997, the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act of 1996, and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 2001,
expressly gave parties latitude to contract around fiduciary duties, to a large extent.
Loewenstein notes that post-RUPA, Delaware and other states have moved even farther
in the direction of the contractarians' freedom of contract model by permitting parties to
disclaim fiduciary duties.
3
Nonetheless, a consensus of states seems to support a "middle ground" approach,
permitting parties to limit fiduciary duties but only to the extent that "the limitation is
'not manifestly unreasonable. ' 'A Loewenstein supports this middle position on the basis
of pragmatism. First because he fears that without this express limitation courts will
insinuate their own notions of fairness into their analyses with uncertain and
inappropriate results. Like Karl Llewellyn, he believes that "'covert tools are never
reliable tools.' 5 For example, the judge-made standard of unconscionability would be
an inappropriate substitute for fiduciary duties in business governance because that
doctrine was crafted to deal with unequal bargain power in contract formation-
especially of consumer products contracts-where unconscionability must be evidenced
both procedurally (no meaningful choice) and substantively (unfair terms). That kind of
doctrine is simply unsuitable to an investor contract where there are investment options.
Nonetheless, Loewenstein argues, courts are not wrong to insist that the public expects
some protection from opportunistic overreaching by those who manage the public's
investments. He concludes that a legislatively-devised standard like the "manifestly
unreasonable" limitation imposed by many states upon fiduciary disclaimers "[sends] an
unmistakable message to the courts-the agreement of the parties is to be given
considerable, but not complete, deference."
6
Like Loewenstein, Professor Robert W. Hillman frames the conundrum of
fiduciary duties under two templates. The first template is the tension between the
contractarian perspective and the fiduciarian view; the second template is the alternative
source of law issue-legislative solutions, on the one hand, and decisional doctrine
2. 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 411 (2006).
3. Id.
4. Id. at414.
5. Id. at 414 n. 21 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing
0. Prausnitz, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law (Sweet &
Marshall 1937))); see id. at 414.
6. Loewenstein, supra n. 2, at 440.
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developed by the judiciary, on the other. The particular focus of Hillman's analysis in
his article, Closely-Held Firms and the Common Law of Fiduciary Duty: What Explains
the Enduring Qualities of a Punctilio?, is the issue of fiduciary duty as it relates to
closely-held businesses.7 Hillman presents a fascinating perspective on the common law
approaches to fiduciary duty. Offering some empirical support for his thesis, he argues
persuasively that while judicial decisions in fiduciary duty cases over time evince all the
indeterminacies of case-by-case or totality of the circumstances analysis, there have also
been remarkable coherence and stability in the standards courts bring to bear on these
cases. Using Meinhard v. Salmon8 as the enduring exemplar of fiduciarianism and a
fundamental standard for the common law on this issue, Hillman argues that in spite of
Meinhard's academic detractors, its authority in case law has continued since its
inception virtually unabated. Further, there is some evidence that in the most recent five
year period (2000 to 2005), citation to Meinhard as an authority may be increasing.
The tenacity of the high standard set by Meinhard for parties in closely-held business
entities seems remarkable in light of Loewenstein's demonstration that legislatures have
moved in the opposite direction. It may be that courts reflect a public expectation that
private investments will be protected from opportunistic overreaching.
9
Professor Reza Dibadj is an unabashed fiduciarian. His article, The Misguided
Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, situates fiduciary business standards as a
species of common law agency principles. 10 He argues that the most recent uniform
laws and Delaware statutes that have undermined the efficacy of fiduciary duties are
misguided. He supports his position on several grounds. Moreover, because the duty of
loyalty is considered to be the "most prominent" fiduciary duty in business association
law, he uses it to illustrate his thesis that contractarianism is inherently flawed. 1
1
First, he argues that conflating business association law with contract law elides
the important distinction between a relationship of entrustment with a relationship of
reciprocity. Entrustment requires that the party who has control over the business
investments of another act as a fiduciary. Thus, the contractual duty of good faith and
fair dealing-which presupposes relatively equal bargaining power between two
self-interested principals-is no substitute for a fiduciary duty of loyalty in a relationship
in which one party has control of another party's assets. Second, Dibadj argues that
uniform and state statutes that have adopted the contractarian approach ignore the
question of to whom or to what the duty of loyalty is owed and any differences of
obligation entailed in that distinction.12
Dibadj also challenges the contractarian perspective for its reliance on neoclassical
"law and economics" theory. That theory, he argues, has failed to live up to its doctrinal
claims and has proven to be out of touch with the realities of business relationships.1
3
7. 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 441 (2006).
8. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
9. Hillman, supra n. 7.
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Finally, Dibadj asserts that the contractarian turn in uniform and Delaware statutes
ignores the importance of social norms and tradition in law. Moreover, like Lowenstein
and Hillman, Dibadj observes that courts have been markedly more cognizant of these
imbedded aspects of law and, apparently for that reason, much more reluctant to follow
the contractarian turn associated with statutory law.
14
In spite of the foregoing, Dibadj fears the weight of the law seems to favor
elimination of fiduciary duties. But, he concludes by suggesting an ironic twist that:
"Unsurprisingly, the law is already finding it necessary to impose layers of regulation to
compensate for eviscerated fiduciary duties."
1 5
In A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business Organization Law,
Professor Carter G. Bishop undertakes a detailed analysis of fiduciary standards under
Delaware corporate law and compares them with similar standards under the Uniform
Acts covering unincorporated business and nonprofit entities. 16 In so doing, Bishop
cautions us that the analytical boundaries separating corporate law norms of fiduciary
duties from those of the law pertaining to unincorporated forms are porous, and he
illuminates the tenuous demarcation between these two areas of law by reference to
Delaware case law. Thus, he demonstrates that errors in Delaware's exculpatory
corporate law, relative to fiduciary duties, can insinuate themselves into its
unincorporated business entity law. This is especially true of the duty of care, which
Bishop notes is not-precisely-a "fiduciary" one. That misnomer notwithstanding,
Bishop explicates his thesis by revisiting the evolution-or, perhaps more accurately,
devolution-of Delaware's "triad" of corporate fiduciary duties: loyalty, care, and the
recently minted "duty of good faith," which-Bishop hastens to add-is not separately
actionable. His robust, succinct, and precise rendition of that chronology culminates in
the 2006 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation1 7 decision which concluded that
any negligence in the Board's decisions failed to indicate bad faith, failed to prove
self-benefit, and, thereby, exonerated the directors of liability premised upon breach of
fiduciary duties. Analyzing the dangers inherent in the rationale of the court in Disney,
along with that of its predecessor, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,18 Bishop argues for
an approach that would revive both the duty of care-employing a bad faith standard to
eviscerate exculpatory norms under an ordinary negligence test-and the fiduciary duty
of loyalty by eliminating proof of self-benefit and replacing it with a more proactive duty
of "positive devotion and attention to the best interests of the entity."
19
In sum, the reader will find that, from a shared body of knowledge, the authors
have gleaned very different insights, each of which will serve to enrich our
understanding of the nature and efficacy of fiduciary duties in business governance law.
14. Id.
15. Dibadj, supra n. 10, at 476.
16. 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 479 (2006).
17. 2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8, 2006).
18. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
19. Bishop, supra n. 16, at 511.
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III. CAPITAL LOCK-IN/ASSET PARTITIONING
While the dispute over the efficacy of mandatory fiduciary duties is longstanding,
the second topic has only recently been identified as one that can enhance our ability
properly to assess the singular nature of the corporate business entity.
Professor Margaret Blair, a path-breaking scholar on the topic, guides us through
this portion of the symposium with her article, On Models, Metaphors, Rhetoric, and the
Law, commenting on two pieces that dispute some of her own work in the area,
2 1
as well as her assessment of Hillman's article, 22 which acts as an interesting bridge
between the two topics in this law review symposium by suggesting an interplay, as Blair
points out, between the two.
The recognition of the "lock-in" characteristic of the corporate entity is one that is
rich in providing important insights into corporate governance. In a larger sense, the
identification of the lock-in characteristic is strikingly reminiscent of Professor Steven L.
Winter's perspective in his monumental work on law and cognitive theory, appearing
first in a series of law review articles and then culminating in his book, A Clearing in the
23Forest: Law, Life, and Mind. In that body of work, Winter shows how legal analysis
follows patterns of cognition or critical thinking by, in the first instance, breaking entities
down into conceptual categories and then employing metaphors that enlighten
understanding of the new categories by reference to their similarities with more familiar
categories or models.
Here, having identified the category of lock-in for interrogation, scholarly
metaphors are introduced to expand our understanding of the category. Indeed, in
accordance with the title of Blair's article, she has identified and critiqued the metaphors
(or models) introduced by the other three scholars in their attempt to shed light on the
nature of the corporation and, expressly or inferentially, on the category (or corporate
characteristic) of lock-in. At the outset, Blair cautions, and Winter would certainly
concur, that while metaphors and models can aid in understanding conceptual categories,
they are, by their very nature, incomplete descriptions and can, therefore, be misleading.
Or, as Winter might put it, the answer to the ineluctably incomplete nature of a particular
metaphor or model is more (admittedly) incomplete metaphors or models. Each sheds
light on different aspects of the subject category under interrogation. Framing the topic
in terms of the utility of metaphors employed, as Blair does, is an effective way of
addressing the specific corporate characteristics of lock-in.
24
The dominant model and metaphor for corporate entities is the "nexus of
contracts" model espoused by the contractarians, on the one hand, and the "legal person"
metaphor espoused by other scholars, like fiduciarians. It would seem that the lock-in
characteristic, because it is a mandate of the state, fits more comfortably within the legal
20. 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 515 (2006).
21. See Larry Cati Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law
beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 543 (2006); Larry E. Ribstein, Should
History Lock in Lock-in? 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 525 (2006).
22. Supra n. 7.
23. Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (U. Chi. Press 2001).
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person metaphor for the corporation. Indeed, even contractarians like Professor Larry E.
Ribstein concede that lock-in is a characteristic that may not fit a nexus of contracts
model intuitively.25 But, he hastens to add that, at the same time, there is no impediment
to freely contracting lock-in, and, on that point, he challenges Blair's historical view that
the corporate form inevitably became the preferred business model because of its unique
lock-in feature. Moreover, he argues that lock-in is not an unqualified blessing and he
notes various costs associated with it. In response, Blair acknowledges that the corporate
form was not historically inevitable, but she also questions whether the contractarian
metaphor that Ribstein employs is not descriptively incomplete. Furthermore, she
suggests that its utility to contractarians is not descriptive but rather normative: to further
the anti-regulatory, freedom of contract policies scholars like Ribstein espouse.
Professor Larry Catd Backer's view of the corporate form utilizes both the nexus
of contract metaphor and the legal person metaphor.26 He synthesizes the two metaphors
by demonstrating the nexus of contracts that corporations envelop require the imprimatur
and infrastructure of the state to enforce these corporate bargains. However, he
acknowledges the limitations of the legal person model in describing multi-national
corporations because their ability to reach beyond the authority of any particular state
affords them a degree of "enterprise autonomy."
2 7
Hillman offers a fourth perspective on the dominant corporate metaphors.
As discussed above, he revisits the trend in business association statutory law toward a
contractarian approach that allows business entities to contract around previously
mandatory fiduciary duties. But, as an empirical matter, he demonstrates the enduring
strength of those mandatory norms in contemporary case law, which he posits as some
evidence that the legal person metaphor continues to resonate within the legal culture.
28
Taken together, these four articles interact in interesting ways as a dialogic that
helps to inform our understanding of the corporate characteristic of capital lock-in and,
in the larger sense, the nature of the corporation.
25. See Ribstein, supra n. 21.
26. See Backer, supra n. 21.
27. Id.
28. Hillman, supra n. 7.
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